Degraded Broadcast Channel with Secrecy Outside a Bounded Range by Zou, Shaofeng et al.
Degraded Broadcast Channel with Secrecy Outside a
Bounded Range
Shaofeng Zou, Yingbin Liang, Lifeng Lai, H. Vincent Poor and Shlomo Shamai (Shitz)
Abstract
The K-receiver degraded broadcast channel with secrecy outside a bounded range
is studied, in which a transmitter sends K messages to K receivers, and the channel
quality gradually degrades from receiver K to receiver 1. Each receiver k is required to
decode message W1, . . . ,Wk, for 1 ≤ k ≤ K, and to be kept ignorant of Wk+2, . . . ,WK ,
for k = 1, . . . ,K − 2. Thus, each message Wk is kept secure from receivers with at
least two-level worse channel quality, i.e., receivers 1, . . ., k − 2. The secrecy capacity
region is fully characterized. The achievable scheme designates one superposition layer
to each message with binning employed for each layer. Joint embedded coding and
binning are employed to protect all upper-layer messages from lower-layer receivers.
Furthermore, the scheme allows adjacent layers to share rates so that part of the rate
of each message can be shared with its immediate upper-layer message to enlarge the
rate region. More importantly, an induction approach is developed to perform Fourier-
Motzkin elimination of 2K variables from the order of K2 bounds to obtain a close-form
achievable rate region. An outer bound is developed that matches the achievable rate
region, whose proof involves recursive construction of the rate bounds and exploits the
intuition gained from the achievable scheme.
Key words: Broadcast channel, embedded coding, binning, rate splitting and sharing,
secrecy outside a bounded range, secrecy capacity region
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1 Introduction
The broadcast channel models an important type of scenarios in which the transmitter’s
signal can simultaneously reach multiple receivers, and it has been widely used in wireless
communications. Within the communication range of the transmitter, some receivers are
intended while some are non-intended or even eavesdroppers from which the messages should
be kept secure. Due to this broadcast nature of wireless communications, security has
arisen as an important issue. Various broadcast channel models with different transmission
reliability constraints (i.e., legitimate receivers should decode messages destined for them)
and different secrecy constraints (i.e., eavesdroppers should be kept ignorant of messages)
have been intensively studied (see recent surveys [4–9]).
The basic broadcast channel with the secrecy constraint was the wiretap channel initiated
by Wyner in [10], in which a transmitter has a message intended for a legitimate receiver
and wishes to keep this message secure from an eavesdropper. Csisza´r and Ko¨rner further
generalized this model to the case with one more common message intended for both the
legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper in [11].
These broadcast models were further generalized to the multi-receiver case in [12] and [13],
in which a transmitter has a number of messages intended for a set of receivers, and all
messages need to be secure from an eavesdropper. Another class of extension is the broadcast
channel with layered decoding and layered secrecy [13–15], in which the transmitter has a
number of messages intended for a set of receivers and as the channel quality of a receiver gets
one level better, one more message is required to be decoded, and this message is required
to be secure from all receivers with worse channel quality. More specifically, a K-receiver
broadcast channel is considered in [15] (K = 3 in [13] and [14]), in which a transmitter sends
K messages to K receivers. The channel quality gradually degrades from receiver K to
receiver 1. Receiver k is required to decode the first k messages W1, . . . ,Wk for 1 ≤ k ≤ K,
and to be kept ignorant of messages Wk+1, . . . ,WK for 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1.
We note that for the model considered in [13–15], the additional message decoded by a
better receiver needs to be kept secure from the receiver with only one level worse channel
quality. Here, any message Wk should be decoded by receiver k, and be kept secure from
receiver k − 1. Such a model is well defined when receivers k and k − 1 have nonzero
difference in channel quality so that nonzero secrecy rate can be achieved for Wk. However,
such a model is not useful if the difference in channel quality between the adjacent receivers
becomes asymptotically small (i.e., close to zero), because essentially no secrecy rate can
be achieved under the secrecy requirement of the model. For example, consider a fading
broadcast channel, in which the channel to each receiver is determined by a channel gain
coefficient with amplitude h, where h is continuous (the larger h, the better the channel).
Here, the channel gains between two adjacent receivers can be arbitrarily close, and hence
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zero secrecy rate can be achieved for a message required to be decoded by one receiver and
secured from the other receiver.
In this paper, we are interested in a model in which any message decoded at a certain
receiver is not required to be kept secure from the one-level-worse receiver, but kept secure
from the multiple (possibly infinite)-level-worse receiver. Such a model is valid as long as the
“the multiple (possibly infinite) levels” create nonzero differences in channel quality between
receivers. In the fading channel, such a model captures scenarios in which messages intended
for receivers with h > h0 be kept secure from receivers with h < h0 −∆, i.e., the messages
are not necessarily kept secure from receivers with channel quality between h0 −∆ and h0.
Here, ∆ > 0 guarantees nonzero difference between receivers required to decode the messages
and receivers required to be ignorant of the messages, so that nonzero secrecy rate can be
achieved. We refer to such a secrecy requirement as secrecy outside a bounded range.
We note that although this paper focuses on the case with ∆ corresponding to two levels of
channel quality (as we describe below in more detail), the technical treatment here already
contains all the necessary ingredients to design capacity-achieving secrecy schemes for the
general case with secrecy outside arbitrary m levels of channel quality. We discuss this
generalization in Section 5. We also note that we recently applied/generalized this study to
the fading channel in [16].
More formally, we consider the K-receiver degraded broadcast channel with secrecy outside
a bounded range (see Fig. 1), in which a transmitter sends K messages to K receivers. The
channel satisfies the degradedness condition, i.e., the channel quality gradually degrades from
receiver K to receiver 1. Furthermore, receiver k is required to decode the first k messages,
W1, . . . ,Wk, for 1 ≤ k ≤ K, and to be kept secure of Wk+2, . . . ,WK for k = 1, . . . , K − 2.
Each message Wk is required to be secure from the receiver k− 2, which has two level worse
channel quality, for 3 ≤ k ≤ K. In this way, the secrecy is required outside a range of two
level channel quality.
The main result of this paper lies in the complete characterization of the secrecy capacity
region for the K-receiver degraded broadcast channel with secrecy outside a bounded range.
To understand the challenges of the problem and the novelty of the paper, we first describe
special cases, namely three-receiver and four-receiver models, studied by the authors in
earlier conference versions [1,2]. For three-receiver model, we show in [1] that superposition
of messages and joint binning and embedded coding (using lower layer messages to protect
higher layer messages) achieves the secrecy capacity. However, in [2] we show that a natural
generalization of such a scheme does not provide the capacity region for the four-receiver
model. A novel rate splitting and sharing scheme was proposed in [2], which is shown to
be critical to further enlarge the achievable region and establish the secrecy capacity region
for the four-receiver model. The idea is to first use lower-layer messages as random sources
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to protect higher-layer messages. If the message at a certain layer (say layer k) is more
than enough to protect the higher-layer messages, then such a message can also partially
protect the message at layer k. Consequently, the protected message at layer k can be shared
between layer k and its upper layer to enlarge the secrecy rate region.
Further generalization of the capacity characterization for the above four-receiver model
to the arbitrary K-user case becomes very challenging due to the following reasons. (1)
Based on the understanding in the four-receiver model, each message as well as the random
bin number at each layer can potentially serve as random source to protect all higher-layer
messages (from lower layer receivers). The design of joint embedded coding and binning
is very complicated to handle. For example, consideration of whether to adopt binning at
layer k depends on whether embedded coding of layer k − 1 is sufficient to protect Wk from
receiver k − 2, and whether embedded coding of layer k − 2 and (possible) binning in layer
k − 1 are sufficient to protect Wk−1 and Wk from receiver k − 3, and so on. Incorporating
all these considerations into the design of an achievable scheme is not feasible for arbitrary
K-user model. (2) Due to rate splitting and sharing across adjacent layers, the rate region
is expressed in terms of individual rate components. A typical technique to convert the rate
region in terms of the (total) rate for each message is Fourier-Motzkin elimination. However,
for the arbitrary K-user model, a large number of rate variables (more specifically, 2K)
should be eliminated from the order of K2 rate bounds. Such procedure is not analytically
tractable in general. (3) Due to the reason that we employ joint embedded coding and
binning to secure multiple messages, the analysis of secrecy guarantee is much more involved
than the cases with only one or two messages secured by binning.
Despite the challenges mentioned above, in this paper, we fully characterize the secrecy
capacity region for the K-receiver model with secrecy outside a bounded range. Our solution
of the problem includes the following new ingredients. (1) Our achievable scheme employs
binning in each layer, which avoids the complex consideration of whether or not it is necessary
to employ binning for each layer. We also make an important observation that rate sharing
only between adjacent layers is sufficient. This observation is critical to keep the obtained
rate region simple enough for further manipulation. (2) We design an induction algorithm
to perform Fourier-Motzkin elimination. Instead of directly eliminating 2K variables from
the order of K2 rate bounds, we eliminate a pair of variables at a time. We then further
show that the region after each elimination step possesses a common structure by induction.
(3) In order to obtain the strong secrecy guarantee for the case with arbitrary K users,
we generalize the arguments in [17–21] in which strong secrecy is obtained through channel
resolvability. (4) Our development of the converse proof involves recursive construction of
upper bound on the rate of each message such that proper terms cancel out across adjacent
messages, and manipulation of the terms by exploiting intuitions in achievable schemes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our system
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model. In Section 3, we present two example models with three receivers and four receivers,
respectively, which motivate the design of the achievable scheme for the model with arbitrary
K receivers. In Section 5, we discuss potential extensions of our results. In Section 4, we
present our main results for the model with arbitrary K receivers. Finally, in Section 6, we
conclude our paper.
2 Channel Model
Figure 1: The K-receiver broadcast channel with secrecy outside a bounded range
In this paper, we consider a K-receiver degraded broadcast channel model with secrecy
outside a bounded range (see Fig. 1). A transmitter sends information to K receivers through
a discrete memoryless channel. The channel transition probability function is PY1···YK |X ,
where X ∈ X denotes the channel input, and Yk ∈ Yk denotes the channel output at receiver
k, for 1 ≤ k ≤ K. The channel is assumed to be degraded, i.e., the following Markov chain
condition holds:
X → YK → YK−1 → · · · → Y1. (1)
Hence, the channel quality gradually degrades from receiver K to receiver 1. There are
in total K messages W1,W2, . . . ,WK intended for K receivers with the following decoding
and secrecy requirements. Receiver k is required to decode messages W1,W2, . . . ,Wk, for
k = 1, 2, . . . , K, and to be kept secure of Wk+2, . . . ,WK , for k = 1, . . . , K − 2 (see Fig. 1).
A (2nR1 , · · · , 2nRK , n) code for the channel consists of
• K message sets: Wk ∈ Wk = {1, · · · , 2nRk} for k = 1, · · · , K, which are independent from
each other and each message is uniformly distributed over the corresponding message set;
• A (possibly stochastic) encoder fn: W1× · · · ×WK → X n that maps a message tuple to
an input xn;
• K decoders gnk : Ynk → (W1, · · · ,Wk) that maps an output ynk to a message tuple
(wˆ1, . . . , wˆk) for k = 1, · · · , K.
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A rate tuple (R1, · · · , RK) is said to be achievable, if there exists a sequence of (2nR1 , · · · , 2nRK , n)
codes such that the average error probability
P ne = Pr
(∪Kk=1{(W1, · · · ,Wk) 6= gnk (Y nk )})→ 0, as n→∞, (2)
and the secrecy metric at receiver k
I(Wk, · · · ,WK ;Y nk−2)→ 0, as n→∞, (3)
for k = 3, . . . , K. Here, we consider the strong secrecy metric instead of the weak secrecy
metric as in [10, 11], which requires the mutual information in (3) averaged over the block
length n go to zero as n goes to infinity. The results in this paper may also be extended to
an even stronger security notion as the semantic security [22], which enables quantifying the
security of codes at finite lengths and is of practical importance in cryptography.
The asymptotically small error probability in (2) implies that each receiver k is able to
decode messages W1, . . . ,Wk, and asymptotically small secrecy metric in (3) for each receiver
k implies that Wk, . . . ,WK and Y
n
k−2 are asymptotically independent, i.e., receiver k is kept
ignorant of messages Wk+2, . . . ,WK . Our goal is to characterize the secrecy capacity region
that consists of all achievable rate tuples.
3 Motivating Examples
In this section, we study two motivating examples with K = 3 and K = 4. The purpose is
to motivate the development of the optimal achievable scheme for the case with arbitrary
K receivers step by step. More specifically, we study the example with three receivers to
introduce the technique of joint embedded coding and binning. We study the example with
four receivers to introduce the technique of rate splitting and sharing. These schemes turn
out to be necessary to achieve the secrecy capacity region for the case with arbitrary K
receivers.
3.1 Lessons Learned from K = 3
We start with the case in which there are three receivers (see Fig. 2). In this case, receiver 1
is required to decode W1, receiver 2 is required to decode W1,W2, and receiver 3 is required
to decode W1,W2,W3. The system is also required to satisfy the secrecy constraint that the
message W3 is kept secure from receiver 1.
For such a model, a natural idea is to design superposition coding for encoding three
messages W1,W2,W3 into three layers, and then apply binning in the third layer to protect
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Figure 2: The three-receiver broadcast channel with secrecy outside a bounded range
W3 from receiver 1. However, such a scheme is suboptimal because it ignores an important
fact that the random message W2, which is not required to be decoded by receiver 1, can
provide additional randomness to protect W3 from receiver 1. This is referred to as embedded
coding. In fact, if such a random source of W2 is sufficient to protect W3 from receiver 1,
binning is not necessary. If this is not sufficient to protect W3, we apply binning in the third
layer to further protect W3 from receiver 1. The novelty of such an achievable scheme lies
in exploiting the superposition layer of W2 as embedded coding in addition to the binning
scheme to protect W3. Such a scheme turns out to achieve the secrecy capacity region as
characterized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Consider the three-receiver degraded broadcast channel with secrecy outside
a bounded range as described in Section 2. The secrecy capacity region contains rate tuples
(R1, R2, R3) satisfying
R1 ≤ I(U1;Y1),
R2 ≤ I(U2;Y2|U1),
R3 ≤ min{0, I(U2;Y2|U1)− I(X;Y1|U1)}+ I(X;Y3|U2) (4)
for some PU1U2X such that the following Markov chain condition holds
U1 → U2 → X → Y3 → Y2 → Y1. (5)
Proof. The proof can be found in [1].
The idea of the achievable scheme is also reflected in the expression of the capacity region
in (4). The two bounds in “min” are corresponding to the two cases with the second layer of
W2 being sufficient and insufficient to protect W3, respectively. If I(U2;Y2|U1) > I(X;Y1|U1),
the randomness of W2 is sufficient to exhaust receiver 1’s decoding capability, and hence is
good enough for protecting W3. Thus, in this case, no binning is required in layer 3, and
R3 ≤ I(X;Y3|U2). On the other hand, if I(U2;Y2|U1) ≤ I(X;Y1|U1), binning is required
at layer 3 to protect W3 in addition to randomness of W2, and hence, R3 ≤ I(U2;Y2|U1) −
I(X;Y1|U1) + I(X;Y3|U2).
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We note that a graphical representation of rate and equivocation quantities for the scalar
Gaussian broadcast channel with secrecy outside a bounded range (K = 3) is presented
in [23], which is based on the fundamental relationship between the mutual information and
the minimum mean square error (MMSE) (I-MMSE approach [24]).
3.2 Lessons Learned from K = 4
Figure 3: The four-receiver broadcast channel with secrecy outside a bounded range
In this subsection, we study the model with four receivers (see Fig. 3). In this model,
receiver k is required to decode messages W1, . . . ,Wk, for 1 ≤ k ≤ 4. Furthermore, the
message W3 is required to be secure from receiver 1, and the message W4 is required to be
secure from receivers 1 and 2.
Although this four-receiver model seems to be a straightforward generalization of the
three-receiver model, our exploration turns out to show that the achievable scheme for the
three-receiver model is not sufficient to establish the secrecy capacity region for the four-
receiver model. In order to understand this, we note that a direct generalization of the
achievable scheme for the three-model involves first applying superposition coding to encode
the four messages, and then use the random message W3 as embedded coding together with
the binning in layer 4 (if necessary) to protect W4, and use the random message W2 as
embedded coding together with the binning in layer 3 and layer 4 (if necessary) to protect
W3 and W4. Such a scheme then yields an achievable region with rate tuples (R1, R2, R3, R4)
satisfying
R1 ≤ I(U1;Y1),
R2 ≤ I(U2;Y2;U1),
R3 ≤ I(U3;Y3|U2) + min
(
0, I(U2;Y2|U1)− I(U3;Y1|U1)
)
,
R4 ≤ I(X;Y4|U3),
R4 ≤ I(X;Y4|U3) + I(U3;Y3|U2)− I(X;Y2|U2),
R3 +R4 ≤ I(U3;Y3|U2) + I(X;Y4|U3) + I(U2;Y2|U1)− I(X;Y1|U1), (6)
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for some PU1U2U3X satisfying the Markov chain condition U1 → U2 → U3 → X → Y4 →
· · · → Y1. It turns out to be very difficult to develop the converse proof for the bound
R4 ≤ I(X;Y4|U3) in the above region. Thus, the optimality of the region (6) cannot be
guaranteed.
The major novelty in our scheme for this four-receiver model lies in the design of rate
splitting and sharing, which helps enlarge the achievable region and thus establish the secrecy
capacity region. More specifically, if W3 is sufficient to protect W4, we further split W3 into
two parts, i.e., W3,1 and W3,2, such that W3,1 serves as a random source to secure both W3,2
and W4 from receiver 2. Thus,W3,2 satisfies both the decoding and secrecy requirements for
W4, and hence the rate of W3,2 can be counted towards the rate of either W3 or W4. In this
way, the achievable region can be enlarged. In fact, such an enlarged region is shown to be
the secrecy capacity region as characterized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Consider the four-receiver degraded broadcast channel with secrecy outside
a bounded range as described in Section 2. The secrecy capacity region consists of rate tuples
(R1, R2, R3, R4) satisfying
R1 ≤ I(U1;Y1),
R2 ≤ I(U2;Y2|U1),
R3 ≤ I(U3;Y3|U2) + min
(
0, I(U2;Y2|U1)− I(U3;Y1|U1)
)
,
R4 ≤ I(X;Y4|U3) + I(U3;Y3|U2)− I(X;Y2|U2),
R3 +R4 ≤ I(U3;Y3|U2) + I(X;Y4|U3) + min
(
0, I(U2;Y2|U1)− I(X;Y1|U1)
)
, (7)
for some PU1U2U3X such that the following Markov chain condition holds
U1 → U2 → U3 → X → Y4 → Y3 → Y2 → Y1. (8)
Proof. The proof can be found in [2].
We note that by using rate splitting and sharing, the bound R4 ≤ I(X;Y4|U3) in the region
(6) is replaced by the bound R3 +R4 ≤ I(U3;Y3|U2) + I(X;Y4|U3) in the region (7). Clearly,
the region (7) is larger than the region (6) (for a given distribution of auxiliary random
variables). Furthermore, the converse proof for the new bound on R3 + R4 in (7) can be
derived, and thus establishes the region (7) as the secrecy capacity region.
Moreover, although we learn useful coding ingredients from the three-receiver and four-
receiver cases, direct generalization to arbitrary K-receiver model still gives rise to an an-
alytically intractable achievable scheme. More specifically, the consideration of whether or
not to use binning in the higher layers and whether or not to split and share the rates will
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be complex. For example, when K = 5, whether to use binning in the fifth layer depends on
whether the embedded coding in the third layer and (possibly) binning in the fourth layer are
sufficient to protect W4,W5 from receiver 3 and whether the embedded coding in the fourth
layer is sufficient to protect W5 from receiver 3. Such considerations become intractable
when K is large. Thus, the major design issue for the arbitrary K-receiver case is to develop
an achievable scheme that effectively incorporates the necessary coding ingredients as well
as yielding a tractable rate region for analysis. This is the focus of the following section.
4 Main Results
In this section, we first present our main result of characterization of the secrecy capacity re-
gion for the K-receiver model, and then describe the idea behind the design of the achievable
scheme.
4.1 Secrecy Capacity Region
The following theorem states our main result. For simplicity of notation, we define UK = X.
Theorem 1. Consider the K-receiver degraded broadcast channel with secrecy outside a
bounded range as described in Section 2. The secrecy capacity region consists of rate tuples
(R1, R2, . . . , RK) satisfying
R1 ≤ I(U1;Y1), (9a)
k∑
j=2
Rj ≤
k∑
j=2
I(Uj;Yj|Uj−1), for 2 ≤ k ≤ K, (9b)
k∑
j=l
Rj ≤
(
k∑
j=l−1
I(Uj;Yj|Uj−1)
)
− I(Uk;Yl−2|Ul−2), for 3 ≤ l ≤ k ≤ K, (9c)
for some PU1U2...UK such that the following Markov chain condition holds:
U1 → U2 → · · · → UK → YK → · · · → Y2 → Y1. (10)
Proof. The proof of the achievability and the proof of converse are provided in Appendices
A and C, respectively.
In the above capacity region, the bounds (9a) and (9b) are due to the decoding require-
ments, i.e., receiver k should decode messages W1, . . . ,Wk, for 1 ≤ k ≤ K. The sum rate
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bounds (9b) are due to the rate sharing scheme we design. The bounds (9c) are due to the
secrecy requirements, i.e., messages Wl, . . . ,Wk need to be kept secure from receiver l − 2
for 3 ≤ l ≤ k ≤ K. Furthermore, the bounds (9c) can be further written as
k∑
j=l
Rj ≤
k∑
j=l−1
(
I(Uj;Yj|Uj−1)− I(Uj;Yl−2|Uj−1)
)
,
which has clear intuitive interpretation. The term I(Uj;Yj|Uj−1)− I(Uj;Yl−2|Uj−1) is corre-
sponding to the rate in layer j that can be secure from receiver l − 2 given the knowledge
of layer j − 1. Those rates I(Uj;Yj|Uj−1) − I(Uj;Yl−2|Uj−1) for l − 1 ≤ j ≤ k can all be
counted towards
∑k
j=lRj in accordance to the secrecy requirement of keeping Wl, . . . ,Wk
secured from receiver l − 2.
If we set K = 3 and K = 4, the region in Theorem 1 reduces to equivalent but different
forms from the regions in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2. The equivalence is justified by
the converse proofs. However, the achievable schemes for the three-receiver model in Section
3.1 and the four-receiver model in Section 3.2 cannot be easily generalized to the arbitrary
K-receiver model.
Our design of the achievable scheme for the general arbitrary K-receiver model is different
from those for the three-receiver and four receiver models, and includes the following new
ingredients. The scheme employs binning in each layer, which avoids the complex consider-
ation of whether or not it is necessary to employ binning for each layer. The rate sharing
scheme is limited only between adjacent layers which captures the essence of the problem and
helps simplify the obtained rate region. Furthermore, we design an induction algorithm to
perform Fourier-Motzkin elimination, which makes the problem of eliminating 2K variables
from the order of K2 bounds analytically tractable. These ideas are described in more detail
in Subsection 4.2.
The converse for the achievable region can be developed. The bounds (9a) and (9b) can
be derived following standard steps. However, the proof for the bounds (9c) is more involved
and requires careful recursive construction of the terms such that proper terms cancel out
across adjacent messages.
4.2 Achievable Scheme
In this subsection, we introduce the idea of the achievable scheme for the arbitrary K-receiver
model, which is based on superposition coding, binning, embedded coding, and rate splitting
and sharing. We also sketch the novel induction idea to analyze Fourier-Motzkin elimination
to characterize the achievable region.
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Superposition, binning, embedded coding. We design one layer of codebook for each
message, i.e., layer k corresponds to Wk, for 1 ≤ k ≤ K. To avoid the complex consideration
of whether to use binning, we employ binning in each layer. We divide the codewords in
each layer into a number of bins, where the bin number contains the information of the
corresponding message. We use joint embedded coding and binning to provide randomness
for secrecy.
Rate splitting and sharing. We design rate splitting and sharing to enlarge the achiev-
able region. More specifically, within the k-th layer, we split the message Wk into two parts
Wk,1 and Wk,2. The message Wk,1 serves as embedded coding which is a random source in
addition to the binning to protect Wk,2 and the higher layer messages from receiver Yk−1,
i.e., we require that (Wk,2,Wk+1,1,Wk+1,2, . . . ,WK,1,WK,2) be secure from receiver Yk−1, for
2 ≤ k ≤ K − 1. Furthermore, the upstream receiver Yk+1 can also decode Wk,2 because Yk+1
has a better channel quality than Yk. Thus, the message Wk,2 satisfies both the decoding and
secrecy requirements for message Wk+1, and hence, the rate of Wk,2 can be counted towards
the rate of either Wk or Wk+1. By such a rate sharing strategy, the achievable region is
enlarged.
The rate can only be shared between adjacent receivers, which is an important observation
of this problem, and is critical to reduce the complexity of the design of the rate splitting
and sharing strategy. More specifically, the rate of Wk,2 cannot be counted towards the rates
of Wk+2, . . . ,WK , because Wk+2, . . . ,WK are required to be secure not only from receiver
Yk−1 but also from Yk that are required to decode Wk,2.
Based on the above achievable scheme, we obtain the following achievable region:
R1 ≤ I(U1;Y1),
Rk,1 +Rk,2 ≤ I(Uk;Yk|Uk−1), for 2 ≤ k ≤ K,
Rk−1,2 +
j∑
i=k
(Ri,1 +Ri,2) ≤
j∑
i=k−1
I(Ui;Yi|Ui−1)− I(Uj;Yk−2|Uk−2),
for 3 ≤ k ≤ K, k − 1 ≤ j ≤ K, (11)
where we use the convention that
∑k
i=j Xi = 0 if j > k.
The above region are expressed in terms of component rates due to rate splitting. In
order to express the above region in terms of total rate for each message, we introduce the
technique of rate sharing. We define Rk = Rk−1,2 + Rk,1 for 3 ≤ k ≤ K − 1, R2 = R2,1
and RK = RK−1,2 + RK,1 + RK,2. We then wish to project the region (11) onto the rate
space (R1, . . . , RK). This can be done by adding the above rate definitions to the achievable
region (11) and then perform the Fourier-Motzkin elimination to eliminate Rk,1 and Rk,2 for
2 ≤ k ≤ K.
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Fourier-Motzkin elimination via induction. The total number of bounds in the
achievable region (11) is on the order of K2 with 2K variables to be eliminated. Directly
applying Fourier-Motzkin elimination is not analytically tractable. In order to solve this
problem, we design the following induction algorithm to perform Fourier Motzkin elimina-
tion. We eliminate the rate pairs Rk−1,2 and Rk,1 for 3 ≤ k ≤ K one at each step, and
wish to show that the region Rk after eliminating Rk−1,2 and Rk,1 possesses the following
structure:
R1 ≤ I(U1;Y1),
j∑
i=2
Ri ≤
j∑
i=2
I(Ui;Yi|Ui−1), for 2 ≤ j ≤ k − 1,
k∑
i=2
Ri +Rk,2 ≤
k∑
i=2
I(Ui;Yi|Ui−1),
j∑
i=l
Ri ≤
j∑
i=l−1
I(Ui;Yi|Ui−1)− I(Uj;Yl−2|Ul−2),
for 3 ≤ l ≤ j ≤ k − 1,
k∑
i=l
Ri +Rk,2 ≤
k∑
i=l−1
I(Ui;Yi|Ui−1)− I(Uk;Yl−2|Ul−2),
for 3 ≤ l ≤ k + 1. (12)
Such a claim can be easily verified for the case when k = 3, 4, 5. If such a claim holds for
Rk, we then are able to show (see Appendix B for detailed proof) that the region Rk+1 after
eliminating Rk,2 and Rk+1,1 possesses the same structure given by
R1 ≤ I(U1;Y1), (13)
j∑
i=2
Ri ≤
j∑
i=2
I(Ui;Yi|Ui−1), for 2 ≤ j ≤ k, (14)
k+1∑
i=2
Ri +Rk+1,2 ≤
k+1∑
i=2
I(Ui;Yi|Ui−1), (15)
j∑
i=l
Ri ≤
j∑
i=l−1
I(Ui;Yi|Ui−1)− I(Uj;Yl−2|Ul−2), (16)
for 3 ≤ l ≤ j ≤ k, (17)
k+1∑
i=l
Ri +Rk+1,2 ≤
k+1∑
i=l−1
I(Ui;Yi|Ui−1)− I(Uk+1;Yl−2|Ul−2), (18)
for 3 ≤ l ≤ k + 2. (19)
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The last step is to eliminate (RK−1,2, RK,1, RK,2). Thus, the above induction algorithm and
arguments yield the achievable region in Theorem 1.
5 Extension to More General Cases
In this paper, we have focused on the case with secrecy outside two levels of channel quality.
In fact, such a case captures the essence of this type of model, and the design of the capacity-
achieving secrecy schemes already consists of all the necessary ingredients to address the
general case with secrecy outside arbitrary m levels of channel quality, i.e., the techniques
of joint embedded coding and binning, rate splitting and sharing, and inductive Fourier-
Motzkin elimination.
For m > 2 the rate splitting and sharing are more involved than for the case with m = 2.
Each message Wk should be split into m submessages, Wk,1, . . . ,Wk,m. All the submessages
in layers indexed from k −m + 1 to k − 1 but {Wk−i,i+1}m−1i=1 serve as embedded coding in
addition to binning to protect {Wk−i,i+1}m−1i=1 and all higher-layer (with index no less than k)
submessages from receiver Yk−m. Here, we index the submessages such that Wk,i is secured
from receiver Yk−m+i−1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 2 ≤ k ≤ K. The upstream receiver Yk can also
decode all the submessages {Wk−i,i+1}m−1i=1 . Hence, {Wk−i,i+1}m−1i=1 satisfy both the decoding
and secrecy requirements for message Wk. Then the rates of {Wk−i,i+1}m−1i=1 can be counted
towards the rate of Wk. We then define the rate sharing such that Rk =
∑m−1
i=0 Rk−i,i+1.
Based on the above achievable scheme, we can obtain an achievable region in terms of Wk,j,
for 1 ≤ k ≤ K and 1 ≤ j ≤ m. We then project this region onto the rate space (R1, . . . , RK).
This can be done by a similar but rather complicated inductive Fourier-Motzkin elimination.
The results here can be further generalized to models with continuously changing channel
state parameters, e.g., Gaussian fading channel [25], and Gaussian multiple input multiple
output (MIMO) channel [26]. For example, in our recent work [16], we study the fading
channel with secrecy outside a bounded range. More specifically, we first quantify the con-
tinuous channel state with infinitely many discrete channel states, and then apply/generalize
the techniques in this paper.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the K-receiver degraded broadcast channel with secrecy out-
side a bounded range. We have proposed a novel achievable scheme based on superposition
coding, joint embedded coding and binning, and rate splitting and sharing. The combina-
tion of embedded coding and binning to achieve secrecy captures the fact that lower-layer
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message can serve as embedded coding to protect higher-layer messages. Rate splitting and
sharing are critical to enlarge the achievable region for which the converse proof can be estab-
lished. Moreover, our design exploits an important property that the rate sharing should be
only between adjacent receivers, which significantly reduces the complexity of the achievable
scheme. We have further proposed a novel induction algorithm to perform Fourier-Motzkin
elimination on the achievable region with 2K variables to be eliminated from the order of
K2 bounds. We have also constructed a converse proof, which involves careful recursive
construction of rate bounds, and exploits the intuition gained from embedded coding in
the achievable scheme. By the converse proof, we have demonstrated the optimality of our
achievable scheme and established the secrecy capacity region.
This paper has focused on characterizing the information theoretic performance limits
which is based on random coding arguments. It is of further interest to design practical
coding schemes such as polar codes [27–33] and low density parity check (LDPC) codes [34]
to achieve secrecy capacity.
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Appendix
A Achievability Proof of Theorem 1
The achievability proof is based on superposition coding, embedded coding, binning, rate
splitting and sharing. We use random codes and fix a distribution PU1U2...,UK−1XPY1...YK |X
satisfying the Markov chain condition in (10). Let T n (PU1...UK−1XY1...YK ) denote the strongly
jointly -typical set based on the fixed distribution [35, Chapter 3], [36]. The achievable
scheme is designed as follows:
Random codebook generation: For simplicity, we define UK = X in the following proof,
i.e., PU1···UK−1X = PU1···UK .
• Generate 2nR1 independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) un1 with distribution
∏n
i=1 P (u1,i).
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Index these codewords as un1 (w1), w1 ∈ [1, 2nR1 ].
• For each un1 (w1), generate 2n(R2,1+R2,2) i.i.d. un2 by
∏n
i=1 P (u2,i|u1,i). Partition these code-
words into 2nR2,2 bins. Index these codewords as un2 (w1, w2,1, w2,2), w2,1 ∈ [1, 2nR2,1 ],
w2,2 ∈ [1, 2nR2,2 ].
• For each un2 (w1, w2,1, w2,2), generate 2n(R3,1+R3,2+R3,3) i.i.d. un3 by
∏n
i=1 P (u3,i|u2,i). Parti-
tion these codewords into 2nR3,1 bins, and further partition each bin into 2nR3,2 sub-bins.
Hence, there are 2nR3,3 un3 in each sub-bin. We use w3,1 ∈ [1 : 2nR3,1 ] to denote the bin
number, w3,2 ∈ [1 : 2nR3,2 ] to denote the sub-bin number, and l3 ∈ [1 : 2nR3,3 ] to denote
the index within the bin. Hence, each un3 is indexed by (w1, w2,1, w2,2, w3,1, w3,2, l3).
• For 4 ≤ k ≤ K, for each unk−1(w1, . . . , wk−1,1, wk−1,2, lk−1), generate 2n(Rk,1+Rk,2+Rk,3) i.i.d.
unk by
∏n
i=1 P (uk,i|uk−1,i). Partition these codewords into 2nRk,1 bins, and further partition
each bin into 2nRk,2 sub-bins. Hence, there are 2nRk,3 unk in each sub-bin. We use wk,1 ∈
[1 : 2nRk,1 ] to denote the bin number, wk,2 ∈ [1 : 2nRk,2 ] to denote the sub-bin number,
and lk ∈ [1 : 2nRk,3 ] to denote the index within the bin. Hence, each unk is indexed by
(w1, . . . , wk−1,1, wk−1,2, lk−1, wk,1, wk,2, lk).
The codebook is revealed to both the transmitter and the receivers.
Encoding:
To send a message tuple (w1, w2,1, w2,2, . . . , wK,1, wK,2), the transmitter randomly and uni-
formly generates lk ∈ [1 : 2nRk,3 ] for 3 ≤ k ≤ K, and sends xn(w1, . . . , wK,1, wK,2, l3, . . . , lK).
Decoding:
• Receiver 1 claims that ŵ1 is sent, if there exists a unique ŵ1 such that(
un1 (ŵ1), y
n
1
)
∈ T n (PU1Y1).
Otherwise, it declares an error.
• Receiver 2 claims that (ŵ1, ŵ2,1, ŵ2,2) is sent, if there exists a unique tuple (ŵ1, ŵ2,1, ŵ2,2)
such that (
un1 (ŵ1), u
n
2 (ŵ1, ŵ2,1, ŵ2,2), y
n
2
)
∈ T n (PU1U2Y2).
Otherwise, it declares an error.
• For 3 ≤ k ≤ K, receiver k claims that (ŵ1, . . . , ŵk,1, ŵk,2) is sent, if there exists a unique
tuple (ŵ1, . . . , ŵk,1, ŵk,2, l̂3, . . . , l̂k) such that(
un1 (ŵ1), . . . , u
n
k(ŵ1, . . . , ŵk,1, ŵk,2, l̂3, . . . , l̂k), y
n
k
)
∈ T n (PU1···UkYk).
Otherwise, it declares an error.
16
Analysis of error probability: By the law of large numbers and the packing lemma [37],
receiver k decodes the message (w1, . . . , wk,1, wk,2) for 2 ≤ k ≤ K and receiver 1 decodes
the message w1 with asymptotically small error probabilities if the following inequalities are
satisfied:
R1 ≤ I(U1;Y1),
R2,1 +R2,2 ≤ I(U2;Y2|U1),
Rk,1 +Rk,2 +Rk,3 ≤ I(Uk;Yk|Uk−1), for 3 ≤ k ≤ K. (20)
Analysis of secrecy: We require that Wk−1,2,Wk,1,Wk,2, . . . ,WK,1,WK,2 be secure from
receiver Yk−2 for 3 ≤ k ≤ K. It then suffices to show that
I
(
Wk−1,2,Wk,1,Wk,2, . . . ,WK,1,WK,2;Y nk−2|C
)
→ 0, as n→∞, (21)
for 3 ≤ k ≤ K, where C denotes a random codebook over the codebook ensemble. This
implies the existence of one codebook that guarantees secrecy.
We note that lk in random codebook generation is a realization of the random variable Lk.
For notational convenience, let Lkj = (Lj, . . . , Lk), l
k
j = (lj, . . . , lk) for 3 ≤ j ≤ k ≤ K and
Mk = (Wk−1,2,Wk,1,Wk,2, . . . ,WK,1,WK,2), for 3 ≤ k ≤ K.
By the independence of the messages, i.e., Mk and (W1, . . . ,Wk−2,1,Wk−2,2, Lk−2) are
independent, and the fact that Unk−2 is a function of (W1, . . . ,Wk−2,1,Wk−2,2, Lk−2) given C,
it follows that Unk−2 is independent of Mk, and thus
I(Mk;Y nk−2|C)
= H(Mk|C)−H(Mk|Y nk−2, C)
= H(Mk|Unk−2, C)−H(Mk|Y nk−2, C)
≤ H(Mk|Unk−2, C)−H(Mk|Y nk−2, Unk−2, C)
≤ I(Mk;Y nk−2|Unk−2, C). (22)
Connecting the idea of channel resolvability to secrecy [18–21], it follows that
I(Mk;Y nk−2|Unk−2, C)
= E log
P (Mk, Y nk−2|Unk−2, C)
P (Mk|Unk−2, C)P (Y nk−2|Unk−2, C)
= E log
P (Y nk−2|Mk, Unk−2, C)
P (Y nk−2|Unk−2, C)
= E
[
log
P (Y nk−2|Mk, Unk−2, C)
P (Y nk−2|Unk−2)
+ log
P (Y nk−2|Unk−2)
P (Y nk−2|Unk−2, C)
]
≤ E
[
log
P (Y nk−2|Mk, Unk−2, C)
P (Y nk−2|Unk−2)
]
, (23)
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where the last step is due to the fact that
E
[
log
P (Y nk−2|Unk−2)
P (Y nk−2|Unk−2, C)
]
= −E
[
D(PY nk−2|Unk−2,C‖PY nk−2|Unk−2)
]
≤ 0, (24)
where D(P ||Q) = ∑i P (i) log P (i)Q(i) is the Kullback-Leibler divergence between two distribu-
tions P and Q.
Conditioned on a realization C of the random codebook C, it follows that
P (ynk−2|wk−1,2, wk,1, wk,2, . . . , wK,1, wK,2, unk−2, C)
=
∑
wk−1,1,lKk−1
P (ynk−2, wk−1,1, l
K
k−1|wk−1,2, wk,1, wk,2, . . . , wK,1, wK,2, unk−2, C)
=
1
2n(Rk−1,1+Rk−1,3+...+RK,3)
∑
wk−1,1,lKk−1
P (ynk−2|wk−1,1, wk−1,2, . . . , wK,1, wK,2, lKk−1, unk−2, C)
=
1
2n(Rk−1,1+Rk−1,3+...+RK,3)
∑
wk−1,1,lKk−1
P (ynk−2|unK(w1, . . . , wk,1, wk,2, . . . , wK,1, wK,2, lK3 ), C)
=
1
2n(Rk−1,1+Rk−1,3+...+RK,3)
∑
wk−1,1,lKk−1
P (ynk−2|unK(w1, . . . , wk,1, wk,2, . . . , wK,1, wK,2, lK3 )), (25)
where the last step is due to the Markov chain condition C → UnK → Y nk−2.
Due to the symmetry of the random codebook construction, when computing the expec-
tation in (23), we can assume that all the indices except (Wk−1,1, LKk−1) are fixed constants
and equal to one. For notational convenience, we only include the indices (Wk−1,1, LKk−1)
and ignore all those fixed indices when labeling the codewords. For example, instead of
unk−2(w1, . . . , wk−2,1, wk−2,2, lk−2) and u
n
K(w1, . . . , wk,1, wk,2, . . . , wK,1, wK,2, l
K
3 ), we use u
n
k−2
and unK(wk−1,1, l
K
k−1).
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Following steps similar to those in [19], it can be shown that
E
[
log
P (Y nk−2|Mk, Unk−2, C)
P (Y nk−2|Unk−2)
]
(a)
=
∑
C
P (C)
∑
ynk−2
P (ynk−2|1, . . . , 1, unk−2, C) log
P (ynk−2|1, . . . , 1, unk−2, C)
P (ynk−2|unk−2)
,
=
∑
C
P (C)
∑
ynk−2
1
2n(Rk−1,1+Rk−1,3+...+RK,3)
∑
wk−1,1,lKk−1
P (ynk−2|unK(wk−1,1lKk−1))
log
∑
w˜k−1,1,l˜Kk−1
P (ynk−2|unK(w˜k−1,1, l˜Kk−1))
2n(Rk−1,1+Rk−1,3+...+RK,3)P (ynk−2|unk−2)
(b)
=
∑
C
P (unk−2)
∏
wˆk−1,1,lˆk−1
[
P (unk−1(wˆk−1,1, lˆk−1)|unk−2)
[
· · ·
∏
lˆK
P (unK(wˆk−1,1, lˆ
K
k−1)|unK−1(wˆk−1,1, lˆK−1k−1 ))
]]
∑
ynk−2
1
2n(Rk−1,1+Rk−1,3+...+RK,3)
∑
wk−1,1,lKk−1
P (ynk−2|unK(wk−1,1lKk−1))
log
∑
w˜k−1,1,l˜Kk−1
P (ynk−2|unK(w˜k−1,1, l˜Kk−1))
2n(Rk−1,1+Rk−1,3+...+RK,3)P (ynk−2|unk−2)
(c)
=
1
2n(Rk−1,1+Rk−1,3+...+RK,3)
∑
C
∑
ynk−2
∑
wk−1,1,lKk−1
P (unk−2)
∏
wˆk−1,1,lˆk−1
[
P (unk−1(wˆk−1,1, lˆk−1)|unk−2)
[
· · ·
∏
lˆK
P (unK(wˆk−1,1, lˆ
K
k−1)|unK−1(wˆk−1,1, lˆK−1k−1 ))
]]
P (ynk−2|unK(wk−1,1lKk−1))
log
∑
w˜k−1,1,l˜Kk−1
P (ynk−2|unK(w˜k−1,1, l˜Kk−1))
2n(Rk−1,1+Rk−1,3+...+RK,3)P (ynk−2|unk−2)
, (26)
where in (a), by the symmetry of the random codebook construction, we let Unk−2 = u
n
k−2(1, . . . , 1),
Mk = (1, . . . , 1); and in (b) and the following equations, C consists only of those codewords
with all the indices except (wk−1,1, lKk−1) being one; (c) is obtained by reordering those sum-
mations.
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From (26), it follows that
E
[
log
P (Y nk−2|Mk, Unk−2, C)
P (Y nk−2|Unk−2)
]
=
1
2n(Rk−1,1+Rk−1,3+...+RK,3)
∑
wk−1,1,lKk−1
∑
ynk−2
∑
unk−2
∑
unk−1(wk−1,1,lk−1)
· · ·
∑
unK(wk−1,1l
K
k−1)
P (ynk−2, u
n
K(wk−1,1l
K
k−1), · · · , unk−2)∑
C\{unk−2,··· ,unK(wk−1,1lKk−1)}
∏
wˆk−1,1,lˆk−1
[
P (unk−1(wˆk−1,1, lˆk−1)|unk−2)
[
· · ·
∏
lˆK
P (unK(wˆk−1,1, lˆ
K
k−1)|unK−1(wˆk−1,1, lˆK−1k−1 ))
]]
1
P (unk−1(wk−1, lk−1), . . . , wK(wk−1, l
K
k−1)|unk−2)
log
∑
w˜k−1,1,l˜Kk−1
P (ynk−2|unK(w˜k−1,1, l˜Kk−1))
2n(Rk−1,1+Rk−1,3+...+RK,3)P (ynk−2|unk−2)
(a)
≤ 1
2n(Rk−1,1+Rk−1,3+...+RK,3)
∑
wk−1,1,lKk−1
∑
ynk−2
∑
unk−2
∑
unk−1(wk−1,1,lk−1)
· · ·
∑
unK(wk−1,1l
K
k−1)
P (ynk−2, u
n
K(wk−1,1l
K
k−1), · · · , unk−2) log
(
E
∑
(w˜k−1,1,l˜Kk−1)6=(wk−1,1,lKk−1) P (y
n
k−2|UnK(w˜k−1,1, l˜Kk−1))
2n(Rk−1,1+Rk−1,3+...+RK,3)P (ynk−2|unk−2)
+
P (ynk−2|unK(wk−1,1, lKk−1))
2n(Rk−1,1+Rk−1,3+...+RK,3)P (ynk−2|unk−2)
)
, (27)
where (a) follows by the concavity of the logarithm and Jensen’s inequality applied to the
expectation over all the codewords except
(
unk−2, u
n
k−1(wk−1, lk−1), . . . , u
n
K(wk−1, l
K
k−1)
)
.
We now consider the expectation in (27) for different values of (w˜k−1,1, l˜Kk−1). We first
define
P (ynk−2|unK(wk−1,1, lKk−1))
2n(Rk−1,1+Rk−1,3+...+RK,3)P (ynk−2|unk−2)
∆
= AK . (28)
For (w˜k−1,1, l˜K−1k−1 ) = (wk−1,1, l
K−1
k−1 ) but l˜K 6= lK , we obtain a term∑
l˜K 6=lK
P (ynk−2|unK−1(wk−1,1, lK−1k−1 ))
2n(Rk−1,1+Rk−1,3+...+RK,3)P (ynk−2|unk−2)
≤ P (y
n
k−2|unK−1(wk−1,1, lK−1k−1 ))
2n(Rk−1,1+Rk−1,3+...+RK−1,3)P (ynk−2|unk−2)
∆
= AK−1. (29)
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More generally, for any k − 1 ≤ j ≤ K − 1, for (w˜k−1,1, l˜jk−1) = (wk−1,1, ljk−1) but l˜j+1 6= lj+1,
we obtain a term ∑
l˜Kj+1:l˜j+1 6=lj+1
P (ynk−2|unj (wk−1,1, ljk−1))
2n(Rk−1,1+Rk−1,3+...+RK,3)P (ynk−2|unk−2)
≤ P (y
n
k−2|unj (wk−1,1, ljk−1))
2n(Rk−1,1+Rk−1,3+...+Rj,3)P (ynk−2|unk−2)
∆
= Aj. (30)
For (w˜k−1,1, l˜k−1) 6= (wk−1,1, lk−1), we obtain a term∑
(w˜k−1,1,l˜Kj+1):(w˜k−1,1,l˜k−1) 6=(wk−1,1,lk−1)
P (ynk−2|unk−2)
2n(Rk−1,1+Rk−1,3+...+RK,3)P (ynk−2|unk−2)
≤ 1. (31)
Combining (28) (30) and (31) yields that the term within the log in (27) is upper bounded
by 1 +
∑K
j=k−1Aj, which further implies that
E
[
log
P (Y nk−2|Mk, Unk−2, C)
P (Y nk−2|Unk−2)
]
≤ E log
(
1 +
K∑
j=k−1
P (Y nk−2|Unj (Wk−1,1, Ljk−1))
2n(Rk−1,1+Rk−1,3+...+Rj,3)P (Y nk−2|Unk−2)
)
≤
K∑
j=k−1
E log
(
1 +
P (Y nk−2|Unj (Wk−1,1, Ljk−1))
2n(Rk−1,1+Rk−1,3+...+Rj,3)P (Y nk−2|Unk−2)
)
.
(32)
By the symmetry of the random codeword generation, we assume that (Wk−1,1, LKk−1) are
fixed, and thus in the following proof, we ignore these indices. For any k − 1 ≤ j ≤ K, it
then follows that
E log
(
1 +
P (Y nk−2|Unj )
2n(Rk−1,1+Rk−1,3+...+Rj,3)P (Y nk−2|Unk−2)
)
=
∑
(unk−2,u
n
j ,y
n
k−2)
∈Tn (PUk−2UjYk−2 )
P (unk−2, u
n
j , y
n
k−2) log
(
1 +
P (ynk−2|unj )
2n(Rk−1,1+Rk−1,3+...+Rj,3)P (ynk−2|unk−2)
)
+
∑
(unk−2,u
n
j ,y
n
k−2)
/∈Tn (PUk−2UjYk−2 )
P (unk−2, u
n
j , y
n
k−2) log
(
1 +
P (ynk−2|unj )
2n(Rk−1,1+Rk−1,3+...+Rj,3)P (ynk−2|unk−2)
)
∆
= d1 + d2. (33)
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Using the inequalities in [36, Appendix] and following steps similar to those in [19], we have
d1 ≤
∑
(unk−2,u
n
j ,y
n
k−2)
∈Tn (PUk−2UjYk−2 )
P (unk−2, u
n
j , y
n
k−2) log
(
1 +
2−n(1−)H(Yk−2|Uj)
2n(Rk−1,1+Rk−1,3+...+Rj,3)2−n(1+)H(Yk−2|Uk−2)
)
≤ log
(
1 +
2−n(1−)H(Yk−2|Uj)
2n(Rk−1,1+Rk−1,3+...+Rj,3)2−n(1+)H(Yk−2|Uk−2)
)
, (34)
which vanishes as n→∞ if
Rk−1,1 +Rk−1,3 + . . .+Rj,3 > I(Uj;Yk−2|Uk−2) + 2H(Yk−2|Uk−2). (35)
To show d2 → 0 as n→∞, it follows that
d2 ≤
∑
(unk−2,u
n
j ,y
n
k−2)/∈Tn (PUk−2UjYk−2 )
(unk−2,u
n
j ,y
n
k−2)∈supp(PUnk−2,Unj ,Y nk−2 )
P (unk−2, u
n
j , y
n
k−2) log
(
1 +
(
1
µ
)n)
≤ 2|Uk−2||Uj||Yk−2|e−2φn/3n log
(
1 +
1
µ
)
→ 0, as n→∞. (36)
where supp(PX) is defined to be the support of a distribution PX , |Uk−2|, |Uj| and |Yk−2| are
the support sizes of Uk−2, Uj and Yk−2, respectively, and
µ = min
(uk−2,yk−2)∈supp(PUk−2Yk−2 )
P (yk−2|uk−2),
φ = min
(uk−2,uj ,yk−2)∈supp(PUk−2UjYk−2 )
P (uk−2ujyk−2). (37)
Therefore, if the following conditions are satisfied for 3 ≤ k ≤ K and k − 1 ≤ j ≤ K:
Rk−1,1 +Rk−1,3 + . . .+Rj,3 > I(Uj;Yk−2|Uk−2), (38)
then
I(Mk;Y nk−2|Unk−2, C)→ 0, as n→∞, for 3 ≤ k ≤ K. (39)
Combining the bounds in (20) and (38), and by choosing Rk,1+Rk,2+Rk,3 = I(Uk;Yk|Uk−1),
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we conclude that the rate tuple (R1, R2,1, R2,2, . . . , RK,1, RK,2) is achievable if
R1 ≤ I(U1;Y1),
Rk,1 +Rk,2 ≤ I(Uk;Yk|Uk−1), for 2 ≤ k ≤ K,
Rk−1,2 +
j∑
i=k
(Ri,1 +Ri,2) ≤
j∑
i=k−1
I(Ui;Yi|Ui−1)− I(Uj;Yk−2|Uk−2),
for 3 ≤ k ≤ K, and k − 1 ≤ j ≤ K. (40)
Rate Sharing: We note that our achievable scheme guaranteesWk−1,2,Wk,1,Wk,2, . . . ,WK,1,
WK,2 to be secure from receiver Yk−2, for 3 ≤ k ≤ K. Furthermore, due to the degradedness
condition, Wk−1,2 can be decoded by receiver Yk. Thus, Wk−1,2 satisfies both the decoding and
secrecy requirements as Wk. Hence, the rate of Wk−1,2 can be counted towards either Rk−1
or Rk. Based on such an understanding, we design the following rate sharing scheme. We
define R2 = R2,1, Rk = Rk−1,2 +Rk,1 for 3 ≤ k ≤ K−1, and RK = RK−1,2 +RK,1 +RK,2, and
include these equations to the above achievable region. We then perform Fourier-Motzkin
elimination to eliminate Rk,1, Rk,2 for 2 ≤ k ≤ K and obtain a closed-form achievable rate
region. Such a process involves eliminating 2K − 2 variables from the order of K2 bounds,
which is intractable for arbitrary K. We propose an inductive Fourier Motzkin elimination
approach as shown in Appendix B, and obtain the achievable region given in Theorem 1.
B Inductive Fourier-Motzkin Elimination
As we have shown in Appendix A, we need to eliminate Rk,1, Rk,2 for 2 ≤ k ≤ K in the
following region:
R1 ≤ I(U1;Y1), (41a)
Rk,1 +Rk,2 ≤ I(Uk;Yk|Uk−1), for 2 ≤ k ≤ K, (41b)
Rl−1,2 +
j∑
i=l
(Ri,1 +Ri,2) ≤
j∑
i=l−1
I(Ui;Yi|Ui−1)− I(Uj;Yl−2|Ul−2), (41c)
for 3 ≤ l ≤ K, l − 1 ≤ j ≤ K,
R2 = R2,1, (41d)
Rk = Rk−1,2 +Rk,1, for 3 ≤ k ≤ K − 1, (41e)
RK = RK−1,2 +RK,1 +RK,2, (41f)
where the bounds (41a), (41b) and (41c) correspond to the achievable region after rate
splitting, which are expressed in terms of component rates, and the bounds (41d), (41e) and
(41f) are corresponding to the rate sharing strategy.
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It can be seen that the total number of bounds in the above region is on the order of
K2 over which 2K − 2 variables need to be eliminated. Directly applying Fourier-Motzkin
elimination is not analytically tractable. We design an inductive algorithm, in which we
eliminate the rate pairs (Rk−1,2, Rk,1) for 3 ≤ k ≤ K − 1 one at each step, and finally
eliminate (RK−1,2, RK,1, RK,2). We first replace R2,1 with R2, Rk−1,2 + Rk,1 with Rk for
3 ≤ k ≤ K − 1, and RK−1,2 +RK,1 +RK,2 with RK , and we obtain the following region:
R1 ≤ I(U1;Y1),
R2 +R2,2 ≤ I(U2;Y2|U1)
Rk,1 +Rk,2 ≤ I(Uk;Yk|Uk−1), for 3 ≤ k ≤ K,
j∑
i=l
Ri +Rj,2 ≤
j∑
i=l−1
I(Ui;Yi|Ui−1)− I(Uj;Yl−2|Ul−2),
for 3 ≤ l ≤ K, l − 1 ≤ j ≤ K − 1,
K∑
i=l
Ri ≤
K∑
i=l−1
I(Ui;Yi|Ui−1)− I(UK ;Yl−2|Ul−2),
for 3 ≤ l ≤ K,
Rk = Rk−1,2 +Rk,1, for 3 ≤ k ≤ K − 1,
RK = RK−1,2 +RK,1 +RK,2. (42)
To start the elimination process, we first eliminate (R2,2, R3,1) from the inequalities given
below, corresponding to the decoding and secrecy requirements of receiver 1 to receiver 3:
R1 ≤ I(U1;Y1),
R2 +R2,2 ≤ I(U2;Y2|U1),
R3,1 +R3,2 ≤ I(U3;Y3|U2),
R2,2 ≤ I(U2;Y2|U1)− I(U2;Y1|U1),
R3 +R3,2 ≤
3∑
i=2
I(Ui;Yi|Ui−1)− I(U3;Y1|U1).
R3,2 ≤ I(U3;Y3|U2)− I(U3;Y2|U2),
R3 = R2,2 +R3,1. (43)
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We then obtain the following inequalities after elimination:
R1 ≤ I(U1;Y1),
R2 ≤ I(U2;Y2|U1),
3∑
i=2
Ri +R3,2 ≤
3∑
i=2
I(Ui;Yi|Ui−1),
R3 +R3,2 ≤
3∑
i=2
I(Ui;Yi|Ui−1)− I(U3;Y1|U1),
R3,2 ≤ I(U3;Y3|U2)− I(U3;Y2|U2), (44)
which we denote as R3.
We then eliminate (R3,2, R4,1) from the inequalities in R3 and the inequalities given below,
which together are corresponding to the decoding and secrecy requirements of receiver 1 to
receiver 4:
R4,1 +R4,2 ≤ I(U4;Y4|U3),
4∑
i=j
Ri +R4,2 ≤
4∑
i=j−1
I(Ui;Yi|Ui−1)− I(U4;Yj−2|Uj−2), for 3 ≤ j ≤ 5
R4 = R3,2 +R4,1. (45)
We then obtain the following bounds after elimination:
R1 ≤ I(U1;Y1),
j∑
i=2
Ri ≤
j∑
i=2
I(Ui;Yi|Ui−1), for 2 ≤ j ≤ 3,
4∑
i=2
Ri +R4,2 ≤
4∑
i=2
I(Ui;Yi|Ui−1),
j∑
i=l
Ri ≤
j∑
i=l−1
I(Ui;Yi|Ui−1)− I(Uj;Yl−2|Ul−2),
for 3 ≤ l ≤ j ≤ 3,
4∑
i=l
Ri +R4,2 ≤
4∑
i=l−1
I(Ui;Yi|Ui−1)− I(U4;Yl−2|Ul−2),
for 3 ≤ l ≤ 5, (46)
which we denote as R4.
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As we observe, the region R3 and R4 conform to the following structure for k = 3 and
k = 4:
R1 ≤ I(U1;Y1),
j∑
i=2
Ri ≤
j∑
i=2
I(Ui;Yi|Ui−1), for 2 ≤ j ≤ k − 1,
k∑
i=2
Ri +Rk,2 ≤
k∑
i=2
I(Ui;Yi|Ui−1),
j∑
i=l
Ri ≤
j∑
i=l−1
I(Ui;Yi|Ui−1)− I(Uj;Yl−2|Ul−2),
for 3 ≤ l ≤ j ≤ k − 1,
k∑
i=l
Ri +Rk,2 ≤
k∑
i=l−1
I(Ui;Yi|Ui−1)− I(Uk;Yl−2|Ul−2),
for 3 ≤ l ≤ k + 1. (47)
We next show that the region Rk takes the structure (47) for any 3 ≤ k ≤ K − 1 using
induction. We have verified such a claim for k = 3, 4. If such a claim holds for Rk, we
eliminate Rk,2 and Rk+1,1 from the inequalities in Rk and the inequalities given below, which
together are corresponding to the decoding and secrecy requirements of receiver 1 to receiver
k + 1:
Rk+1,1 +Rk+1,2 ≤ I(Uk+1;Yk+1|Uk),
k+1∑
i=j
Ri +Rk+1,2 ≤
k+1∑
i=j−1
I(Ui;Yi|Ui−1)− I(Uk+1;Yj−2|Uj−2), for 3 ≤ j ≤ k + 2
Rk+1 = Rk,2 +Rk+1,1. (48)
Then the resulting region, following standard steps of Fourier-Motzkin elimination to elimi-
nate Rk,2 and Rk+1,1, equals (47) for k + 1.
Finally, we eliminate (RK−1,2, RK,1, RK,2), and obtain the achievable region in Theorem 1.
C Converse Proof of Theorem 1
We note that the converse proof is based on the weak secrecy requirement, which is necessarily
valid under the strong secrecy requirement. Such a converse proof also implies that the
secrecy capacity region under the weak and strong secrecy requirements are the same.
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By Fano’s inequality and the secrecy requirements, we have the following inequalities:
H(Wk|Y nk ) ≤ nn, for 1 ≤ k ≤ K, (49)
I(Wk, . . . ,WK ;Y
n
k−2) ≤ n ≤ nn, for 3 ≤ k ≤ K, (50)
both of which implies that
I(Wk, . . . ,WK ;Y
n
k−2|W1, . . . ,Wk−2) ≤ nn, for 3 ≤ k ≤ K. (51)
We denote Y i−1k := (Yk,1, . . . , Yk,i−1), and Y
n
k,i+1 := (Yk,i+1, . . . , Yk,n). We set U1,i :=
(W1, Y
i−1
1 ), U2,i := (W1,W2, Y
i−1
2 ), Uk,i := (W1, . . . ,Wk, Y
i−1
k , Y
n
k−2,i+1), for 3 ≤ k ≤ K.
We note that Y n0 = Y
n
−1 = Φ. Due to the degradedness condition, it can be verified that
(U1,i, U2,i, . . . , UK−1,i, UK,i, Xi) satisfy the following Markov chain condition:
U1,i → U2,i → . . .→ UK,i → Xi → YK,i → . . .→ Y1,i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (52)
We first bound the rate R1. Since W1 is only required to be decoded by receiver Y1, we
obtain the following bound:
nR1 = H(W1) = I(W1;Y
n
1 ) +H(W1|Y n1 )
(a)
≤ I(W1;Y n1 ) + nn =
n∑
i=1
I(W1;Y1i|Y i−11 ) + nn
≤
n∑
i=1
I(W1, Y
i−1
1 ;Y1i) + nn =
n∑
i=1
I(U1,i;Y1,i) + nn, (53)
where (a) is due to Fano’s inequality.
We further bound the rate R2 as follows:
nR2 = H(W2) = H(W2|W1) = I(W2;Y n2 |W1) +H(W2|Y n2 ,W1)
(a)
≤ I(W2;Y n2 |W1) + nn
=
n∑
i=1
I(W2;Y2,i|W1, Y i−12 ) + nn
(b)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(W1,W2, Y
i−1
2 ;Y2,i|W1, Y i−11 ) + nn
=
n∑
i=1
I(U2,i;Y2,i|U1,i) + nn, (54)
where (a) is due to Fano’s inequality, and (b) is due to the Markov chain condition Y i−11 →
Y i−12 → (W1,W2, Y2,i).
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We then bound the sum rate bounds on
∑k
i=2Ri, for 3 ≤ k ≤ K:
n
k∑
j=2
Rj = H(W2, . . . ,Wk)
(a)
= H(W2|W1) +H(W3|W1,W2) + . . .+H(Wk|W1, . . . ,Wk−1)
(b)
≤ I(W2;Y n2 |W1) + I(W3;Y n3 |W1,W2) + . . .+ I(Wk;Y nk |W1, . . . ,Wk−1) + n(k − 1)n
=
n∑
i=1
I(W2;Y2,i|W1, Y i−12 ) + I(W3;Y3,i|W1,W2, Y i−13 )
+ . . .+ I(Wk;Yk,i|W1, . . . ,Wk−1, Y i−1k ) + n(k − 1)n
= n(k − 1)n +
n∑
i=1
(
I(W2, Y
i−1
2 ;Y2,i|W1, Y i−11 )− I(Y i−12 ;Y2,i|W1, Y i−11 )
+ I(W3, Y
i−1
3 , Y
n
1,i+1;Y3,i|W1,W2, Y i−12 )− I(Y i−13 ;Y3,i|W1,W2, Y i−12 )
− I(Y n1,i+1;Y3,i|W1,W2,W3, Y i−13 )
+
k∑
j=4
(
I(Wj, Y
i−1
j , Y
n
j−2,i+1;Yj,i|W1, . . . ,Wj−1, Y nj−3,i+1, Y i−1j−1 )
+ I(Y nj−3,i+1;Yj,i|W1, . . . ,Wj−1, Y i−1j )
− I(Y i−1j ;Yj,i|W1, . . . ,Wj−1, Y nj−3,i+1, Y i−1j−1 )− I(Y nj−2,i+1;Yj,i|W1, . . . ,Wj, Y i−1j )
))
(c)
≤ n(k − 1)n +
k∑
j=2
n∑
i=1
I(Uj,i;Yj,i|Uj−1,i), (55)
where (a) is due to the independence between the messages (W1, . . . ,Wk), (b) is due to Fano’s
inequality, and (c) is due to the facts that−I(Y i−12 ;Y2,i|W1, Y i−11 ) ≤ 0, −I(Y i−13 ;Y3,i|W1,W2, Y i−12 ) ≤
0, −I(Y nk−2,i+1;Yk,i|W1, . . . ,Wk, Y i−1k ) ≤ 0 and the following inequalities:
−I(Y nj−2,i+1;Yj,i|W1, . . . ,Wj, Y i−1j ) + I(Y nj−2,i+1;Yj+1,i|W1, . . . ,Wj, Y i−1j+1 )
−I(Y i−1j+1 ;Yj+1,i|W1, . . . ,Wj, Y nj−2,i+1, Y i−1j )
(a)
= −I(Y i−1j ;Yj−2,i|W1, . . . ,Wj, Y nj−2,i+1) + I(Y i−1j+1 ;Yj−2,i|W1, . . . ,Wj, Y nj−2,i+1)
− I(Y i−1j+1 ;Yj+1,i|W1, . . . ,Wj, Y nj−2,i+1, Y i−1j )
(b)
= I(Y i−1j+1 ;Yj−2,i|W1, . . . ,Wj, Y nj−2,i+1, Y i−1j )− I(Y i−1j+1 ;Yj+1,i|W1, . . . ,Wj, Y nj−2,i+1, Y i−1j )
(c)
= −I(Y i−1j+1 ;Yj+1,i|W1, . . . ,Wj, Y nj−2,i+1, Y i−1j , Yj−2,i)
≤ 0, (56)
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where (a) is due to Csisza´r’s sum identity property [11], and (b) and (c) are due to the
degradedness condition (1).
We next bound the sum rate bounds on
∑k
j=lRj, for 3 ≤ l ≤ k ≤ K, which correspond to
the secrecy constraints:
n
k∑
j=l
Rj = H(Wl, . . . ,Wk) +H(Wl−1)−H(Wl−1)
(a)
≤
k∑
j=l−1
H(Wj)−H(Wl−1) + nn − I(Wl . . . ,Wk;Y nl−2|W1, . . . ,Wl−2)
(b)
≤
k∑
j=l−1
H(Wj) + nn − I(Wl−1 . . . ,Wk;Y nl−2|W1, . . . ,Wl−2) (57)
where (a) is due to the secrecy requirement (51) and the independence of the messages, and
(b) is due to the following fact:
−H(Wl−1)− I(Wl . . . ,Wk;Y nl−2|W1, . . . ,Wl−2)
= −H(Wl−1)−H(Wl . . . ,Wk|W1, . . . ,Wl−2) +H(Wl . . . ,Wk|Y nl−2,W1, . . . ,Wl−2)
(a)
= −H(Wl−1 . . . ,Wk|W1, . . . ,Wl−2) +H(Wl . . . ,Wk|Y nl−2,W1, . . . ,Wl−2)
≤ −H(Wl−1 . . . ,Wk|W1, . . . ,Wl−2) +H(Wl−1,Wl . . . ,Wk|Y nl−2,W1, . . . ,Wl−2)
= −I(Wl−1 . . . ,Wk;Y nl−2|W1, . . . ,Wl−2), (58)
where (a) is due to the independence of the messages.
We next bound each term in (57) one by one. We first bound H(Wj) for l ≤ j ≤ k as
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follows:
H(Wj)
(a)
≤ H(Wj|W1, . . . ,Wj−1) + nn −H(Wj|Y nj ,W1, . . . ,Wj−1)
= I(Wj;Y
n
j |W1, . . . ,Wj−1) + nn
= nn +
n∑
i=1
I(Wj;Yj,i|W1, . . . ,Wj−1, Y i−1j )
= nn +
n∑
i=1
(
I(Wj, Y
i−1
j , Y
n
j−2,i+1;Yj,i|W1, . . . ,Wj−1, Y i−1j−1 , Y nj−3,i+1)
− I(Y i−1j ;Yj,i|W1, . . . ,Wj−1, Y i−1j−1 , Y nj−3,i+1) + I(Y nj−3,i+1;Yj,i|W1, . . . ,Wj−1, Y i−1j )
− I(Y nj−2,i+1;Yj,i|W1, . . . ,Wj, Y i−1j )
)
= nn +
n∑
i=1
(
I(Uj,i;Yj,i|Uj−1,i)− I(Y i−1j ;Yj,i|W1, . . . ,Wj−1, Y i−1j−1 , Y nj−3,i+1)
+ I(Y nj−3,i+1;Yj,i|W1, . . . ,Wj−1, Y i−1j )− I(Y nj−2,i+1;Yj,i|W1, . . . ,Wj, Y i−1j )
)
(b)
= nn +
n∑
i=1
(
I(Uj,i;Yj,i|Uj−1,i)− I(Y i−1j ;Yj,i|W1, . . . ,Wj−1, Y i−1j−1 , Y nj−3,i+1)
+ I(Y i−1j ;Yj−3,i|W1, . . . ,Wj−1, Y nj−3,i+1)− I(Y nj−2,i+1;Yj,i|W1, . . . ,Wj, Y i−1j )
)
(c)
= nn +
n∑
i=1
(
I(Uj,i;Yj,i|Uj−1,i)− I(Y i−1j ;Yj,i|W1, . . . ,Wj−1, Y i−1j−1 , Y nj−3,i+1)
+ I(Y i−1j ;Yj−3,i|W1, . . . ,Wj−1, Y nj−3,i+1, Y i−1j−1 ) + I(Y i−1j−1 ;Yj−3,i|W1, . . . ,Wj−1, Y nj−3,i+1)
− I(Y nj−2,i+1;Yj,i|W1, . . . ,Wj, Y i−1j )
)
(d)
≤ nn +
n∑
i=1
(
I(Uj,i;Yj,i|Uj−1,i) + I(Y i−1j−1 ;Yj−3,i|W1, . . . ,Wj−1, Y nj−3,i+1)
− I(Y nj−2,i+1;Yj,i|W1, . . . ,Wj, Y i−1j )
)
(e)
= nn +
n∑
i=1
(
I(Uj,i;Yj,i|Uj−1,i) + I(Y nj−3,i+1;Yj−1,i|W1, . . . ,Wj−1, Y i−1j−1 )
− I(Y nj−2,i+1;Yj,i|W1, . . . ,Wj, Y i−1j )
)
(59)
where (a) is due to the independence of the messages and the Fano’s inequality (51), (b) is
due to Csisza´r sum identity property, (c) is due to the degradedness condition (1) and the
30
fact that
I(Y i−1j ;Yj−3,i|W1, . . . ,Wj−1, Y nj−3,i+1)
= I(Y i−1j ;Yj−3,i|W1, . . . ,Wj−1, Y nj−3,i+1, Y i−1j−1 ) + I(Y i−1j−1 ;Yj−3,i|W1, . . . ,Wj−1, Y nj−3,i+1),
(60)
the inequality (d) is due to the degradedness condition (1) and the fact that
−I(Y i−1j ;Yj,i|W1, . . . ,Wj−1, Y i−1j−1 , Y nj−3,i+1) + I(Y i−1j ;Yj−3,i|W1, . . . ,Wj−1, Y nj−3,i+1, Y i−1j−1 )
= −I(Y i−1j ;Yj,i|W1, . . . ,Wj−1, Y i−1j−1 , Y nj−3,i+1, Yj−3,i)
≤ 0, (61)
and (e) is due to Csisza´r’s sum identity property.
Following the intermediate step in (59), H(Wj) is also upper bounded as follows:
H(Wj)≤nn +
n∑
i=1
(
I(Uj,i;Yj,i|Uj−1,i)− I(Y i−1j ;Yj,i|W1, . . . ,Wj−1, Y i−1j−1 , Y nj−3,i+1)
+ I(Y nj−3,i+1;Yj,i|W1, . . . ,Wj−1, Y i−1j )− I(Y nj−2,i+1;Yj,i|W1, . . . ,Wj, Y i−1j )
)
. (62)
Hence, substituting (59) for l ≤ j ≤ k, and (62) for j = l − 1 into the first term in (57),
we obtain,
k∑
j=l−1
H(Wj)
≤ n(k − l + 2)n +
n∑
i=1
k∑
j=l−1
I(Uj,i;Yj,i|Uj−1,i)
+ I(Y nl−4,i+1;Yl−1,i|W1, . . . ,Wl−2, Y i−1l−1 )− I(Y i−1l−1 ;Yl−1,i|W1, . . . ,Wl−2, Y i−1l−2 , Y nl−4,i+1)
− I(Y nk−2,i+1;Yk,i|W1, . . . ,Wk, Y i−1k ). (63)
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We then bound the third term in (57) for 3 ≤ l ≤ k ≤ K as follows:
−I(Wl−1 . . . ,Wk;Y nl−2|W1, . . . ,Wl−2)
=
n∑
i=1
−I(Wl−1 . . . ,Wk;Yl−2,i|W1, . . . ,Wl−2, Y nl−2,i+1)
=
n∑
i=1
−I(Wl−1 . . . ,Wk, Y i−1k ;Yl−2,i|W1, . . . ,Wl−2, Y nl−2,i+1)
+ I(Y i−1k ;Yl−2,i|W1, . . . ,Wk, Y nl−2,i+1)
=
n∑
i=1
−I(Wl−1 . . . ,Wk, Y i−1k , Y nl−2,i+1;Yl−2,i|W1, . . . ,Wl−2, Y nl−4,i+1)
+ I(Y nl−2,i+1;Yl−2,i|W1, . . . ,Wl−2, Y nl−4,i+1) + I(Y i−1k ;Yl−2,i|W1, . . . ,Wk, Y nl−2,i+1)
=
n∑
i=1
−I(Wl−1 . . . ,Wk, Y i−1k , Y nk−2,i+1;Yl−2,i|W1, . . . ,Wl−2, Y i−1l−2 , Y nl−4,i+1)
+ I(Y nk−2,i+1;Yl−2,i|W1, . . . ,Wk, Y i−1k , Y nl−2,i+1)− I(Y i−1l−2 ;Yl−2,i|W1, . . . ,Wl−2, Y nl−4,i+1)
+ I(Y nl−2,i+1;Yl−2,i|W1, . . . ,Wl−2, Y nl−4,i+1) + I(Y i−1k ;Yl−2,i|W1, . . . ,Wk, Y nl−2,i+1)
=
n∑
i=1
−I(Uk,i;Yl−2,i|Ul−2,i)
+ I(Y nk−2,i+1;Yl−2,i|W1, . . . ,Wk, Y i−1k , Y nl−2,i+1)− I(Y i−1l−2 ;Yl−2,i|W1, . . . ,Wl−2, Y nl−4,i+1)
+ I(Y nl−2,i+1;Yl−2,i|W1, . . . ,Wl−2, Y nl−4,i+1) + I(Y i−1k ;Yl−2,i|W1, . . . ,Wk, Y nl−2,i+1)
(a)
=
n∑
i=1
−I(Uk,i;Yl−2,i|Ul−2,i)
− I(Y nl−4,i+1;Yl−2,i|W1, . . . ,Wl−2, Y i−1l−2 ) + I(Y i−1k , Y nk−2,i+1;Yl−2,i|W1, . . . ,Wk, Y nl−2,i+1),
(64)
where (a) is due to the following fact:
n∑
i=1
− I(Y i−1l−2 ;Yl−2,i|W1, . . . ,Wl−2, Y nl−4,i+1) + I(Y nl−2,i+1;Yl−2,i|W1, . . . ,Wl−2, Y nl−4,i+1)
=
n∑
i=1
−H(Yl−2,i|W1, . . . ,Wl−2, Y nl−4,i+1) +H(Yl−2,i|W1, . . . ,Wl−2, Y i−1l−2 , Y nl−4,i+1)
+H(Yl−2,i|W1, . . . ,Wl−2, Y nl−4,i+1)−H(Yl−2,i|W1, . . . ,Wl−2, Y nl−2,i+1)
=
n∑
i=1
H(Yl−2,i|W1, . . . ,Wl−2, Y i−1l−2 , Y nl−4,i+1)−H(Yl−2,i|W1, . . . ,Wl−2, Y i−1l−2 )
=
n∑
i=1
−I(Y nl−4,i+1;Yl−2,i|W1, . . . ,Wl−2, Y i−1l−2 ). (65)
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Substituting (63) and (64) into (57), we obtain
n
k∑
j=l
Rj
≤
k∑
j=l−1
H(Wj) + nn − I(Wl−1 . . . ,Wk;Y nl−2|W1, . . . ,Wl−2)
≤ n(k − l + 3)n +
n∑
i=1
(( k∑
j=l−1
I(Uj,i;Yj,i|Uj−1,i)
)
− I(Uk,i;Yl−2,i|Ul−2,i)
+ I(Y nl−4,i+1;Yl−1,i|W1, . . . ,Wl−2, Y i−1l−1 )− I(Y i−1l−1 ;Yl−1,i|W1, . . . ,Wl−2, Y i−1l−2 , Y nl−4,i+1)
− I(Y nk−2,i+1;Yk,i|W1, . . . ,Wk, Y i−1k )
− I(Y nl−4,i+1;Yl−2,i|W1, . . . ,Wl−2, Y i−1l−2 ) + I(Y i−1k , Y nk−2,i+1;Yl−2,i|W1, . . . ,Wk, Y nl−2,i+1)
)
,
(a)
≤ n(k − l + 3)n +
n∑
i=1
(( k∑
j=l−1
I(Uj,i;Yj,i|Uj−1,i)
)
− I(Uk,i;Yl−2,i|Ul−2,i)
)
, (66)
where (a) is due to the following two facts. The first fact is shown as follows:
n∑
i=1
I(Y i−1k , Y
n
k−2,i+1;Yl−2,i|W1, . . . ,Wk, Y nl−2,i+1)− I(Y nk−2,i+1;Yk,i|W1, . . . ,Wk, Y i−1k )
=
n∑
i=1
H(Yl−2,i|W1, . . . ,Wk, Y nl−2,i+1)−H(Yl−2,i|W1, . . . ,Wk, Y i−1k , Y nk−2,i+1)
−H(Yk,i|W1, . . . ,Wk, Y i−1k ) +H(Yk,i|W1, . . . ,Wk, Y i−1k , Y nk−2,i+1)
= H(Y nl−2|W1, . . . ,Wk)−H(Y nk |W1, . . . ,Wk)
+
n∑
i=1
H(Yk,i|W1, . . . ,Wk, Y i−1k , Y nk−2,i+1, Yl−2,i)
= −H(Y nk |W1, . . . ,Wk, Y nl−2) +
n∑
i=1
H(Yk,i|W1, . . . ,Wk, Y i−1k , Y nk−2,i+1, Yl−2,i)
=
n∑
i=1
−H(Yk,i|W1, . . . ,Wk, Y nl−2, Y i−1k ) +H(Yk,i|W1, . . . ,Wk, Y i−1k , Y nk−2,i+1, Yl−2,i)
≤ 0. (67)
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The second fact is shown as follows:
n∑
i=1
I(Y nl−4,i+1;Yl−1,i|W1, . . . ,Wl−2, Y i−1l−1 )− I(Y i−1l−1 ;Yl−1,i|W1, . . . ,Wl−2, Y i−1l−2 , Y nl−4,i+1)
− I(Y nl−4,i+1;Yl−2,i|W1, . . . ,Wl−2, Y i−1l−2 )
=
n∑
i=1
H(Yl−1,i|W1, . . . ,Wl−2, Y i−1l−1 )−H(Yl−1,i|W1, . . . ,Wl−2, Y i−1l−1 , Y nl−4,i+1)
−H(Yl−1,i|W1, . . . ,Wl−2, Y i−1l−2 , Y nl−4,i+1) +H(Yl−1,i|W1, . . . ,Wl−2, Y nl−4,i+1, Y i−1l−1 )
−H(Yl−2,i|W1, . . . ,Wl−2, Y i−1l−2 ) +H(Yl−2,i|W1, . . . ,Wl−2, Y i−1l−2 , Y nl−4,i+1)
= H(Y nl−1|W1, . . . ,Wl−2)−H(Y nl−2|W1, . . . ,Wl−2)
+
n∑
i=1
−H(Yl−1,i|W1, . . . ,Wl−2, Y nl−4,i+1, Y i−1l−2 , Yl−2,i)
= H(Y nl−1|W1, . . . ,Wl−2, Y nl−2)−
n∑
i=1
H(Yl−1,i|W1, . . . ,Wl−2, Y nl−4,i+1, Y i−1l−2 , Yl−2,i)
=
n∑
i=1
H(Yl−1,i|W1, . . . ,Wl−2, Y nl−2, Y i−1l−1 )−H(Yl−1,i|W1, . . . ,Wl−2, Y nl−4,i+1, Y i−1l−2 , Yl−2,i)
≤ 0. (68)
Furthermore, based on (55), we bound
∑K
j=2Rj as follows:
n
K∑
j=2
Rj ≤ n(k − 1)n +
K∑
j=2
n∑
i=1
I(Uj,i;Yj,i|Uj−1,i)
≤ n(k − 1)n +
K−1∑
j=2
n∑
i=1
I(Uj,i;Yj,i|Uj−1,i) +
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;YK,i|UK−1,i). (69)
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Based on (66), we bound
∑K
j=lRj as follows:
n
K∑
j=l
Rj ≤ n(K − l + 3)n +
n∑
i=1
(( K∑
j=l−1
I(Uj,i;Yj,i|Uj−1,i)
)
− I(UK,i;Yl−2,i|Ul−2,i)
)
= n(K − l + 3)n +
n∑
i=1
(( K−1∑
j=l−1
I(Uj,i;Yj,i|Uj−1,i)
)
+ I(UK,i;YK,i|UK−1,i)− I(UK,i;Yl−2,i|Ul−2,i)
)
(a)
≤ n(K − l + 3)n +
n∑
i=1
(( K−1∑
j=l−1
I(Uj,i;Yj,i|Uj−1,i)
)
+ I(Xi;YK,i|UK−1,i)− I(Xi;Yl−2,i|Ul−2,i)
)
, (70)
where (a) is due to the Markov chain condition (52).
The proof of the converse is then completed by defining a uniformly distributed random
variable Q ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and setting Uk , (Q,Uk,Q), Yk , Yk,Q, for k ∈ [1 : K], and
X , (Q,XQ).
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